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interpretationis a sad legacy of people like Simms thatshouldnot be swept
underthe rug.
Similarly, Guilds has high praise for William Gilmore Simms's
portrayal,in the Sack and Destructionof the Cityof Columbia,S.C. (1865)
of the arrivalof General William T. Shermanand his Unionist troops.
Simms, who had fled to Columbiaas a safe haven from his plantationand
who comparedSherman'sforces to Huns and Vandals, presenteda vivid
and potent-but extremely one-sided-picture of the Yankees, who, in
additionto other depredations,supposedlypreventedlocal firemen from
puttingout the fire thatravagedthe city. This legend of the ruthlessnessand
indifferenceof the Yankees to human sufferingplayed a powerfulrole in
the origins and perpetuationof the "Lost Cause" mythology that united
white southernersfor generationsto come in romanticizingthe Old South
and the Confederacy, especially its military leaders. This mythology
provided the intellectual and moral basis for the racist and reactionary
regimesthatruledthe South for so manyyears afterthe Civil War.
Marion Brunson Lucas, in Sherman and the Burning of Columbia
(1976), developed a much more balancedand multi-causalexplanationof
the events surroundingthe burning of Columbia that repudiates the
Yankees-blocking-the-firemen
story and places Simms's other allegations
in a broader context. Lucas's work had been widely accepted as the
definitive study of this topic. Nevertheless, Guilds completely ignores
Lucas's book and makes extravagantclaims about Simms as a historian.
According to Guilds, Simms's "presencein the city and credibilityas a
historian lend substance to his depiction" (31). Based on this line of
thinking, Guilds concludes that Simms "is particularlyvaluable in his
importanceto both historiansand literaryscholars"(35).
It seems obvious that Guilds has fallen into a prevalent pitfall for
scholarswho spend many years workingon one subject: battendown the
hatchesand defend your man againstall comers
Robert M. Saundersis an independentscholar who has just published a
book entitled Power, the Presidency, and the Preamble: Interpretive
Essays on Selected Presidentsof the UnitedStates (2001).
Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican
War. By Richard Bruce Winders. (College Station: Texas A & M
UniversityPress, 1997. Pp. xvi, 284. Illustrations.Paper,$17.95.)
Texas A&M Press has recentlyissued RichardBruce Winder's 1997 study
of America's Mexican War armyin paperback. In Mr. Polk's Army, the
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author deals with two main topics: the partisan politics of military
appointmentand the democraticspiritof the Americantroopsled by James
K. Polk's many appointees.
Windersis clearlymost interestedin the relationshipbetween partisan
politics and the officer selections of the Polk administration.The author
remindsus early thatthe secretaryof war, William Marcy,had previously
gainednationalnotice with an 1832 Senatespeech vigorouslyassertingthat
"to the victor belong the spoils" (16). The book then proceedsto develop
in greatdetail the evidence for a similaremphasisupon partisanadvantage
in the 1846-1848 officer corps.
Once he has built his case for Democratic leadershipof the officer
corps, Winders makes a more impressionisticcase for democraticspirit
among the enlisted men. This is clearly the topic Windersmost enjoyed
researching. His narrativequickensand his examples sparkleas he draws
uponbothmajorandminorcampaignsfromTexas to Californiato illustrate
common behavioralfeaturesof the enlisted soldier. Concentratingupon
recruitment,training,andcamplife, the book arguesfor an egalitarianspirit
in everythingfrom disciplineto costume. Combat,which might serve as a
test of such ideals as courage, loyalty, and initiative is, however, largely
ignored.
Winders's armyis no monolith. Both regularsand volunteersfought
in the war, and the author makes a clear and lucid explanation of the
backgroundand organizationof each group. He points out that the war
benefitedeach in quite separateways. For the regulars,the war allowed a
purge of many tired, overage generalsand the recruitmentand trainingof
moremotivatedenlistedmen. Forthe volunteers,manyof whom never saw
battle, the war offered an initial burst of excitementthat often yielded to
boredomand indiscipline.
Winders's army is also transitional. In detailing its weaponry,dress,
organization,drill, and tactics, he portraysan institutionabandoningthe
memoriesof the War of 1812 era for a more fluid, industrial,and irregular
style thatwill look fairlyfamiliarto Civil Warbuffs. But no such transition
appearsin such mattersas diet, camp sanitation,andmedicalexpertise,and
the author offers a case that the Mexican War may, proportionateto
numberscommitted,have been the deadliest of America's wars. If Polk
raiseda winning army,he raisedit at a high price.
Contemporaryperceptionsof ethnicityoften color ourview of the war,
particularlywith regardto the role played by Irish immigrants. Winders
acknowledges such issues as the Americantreatmentof the Irishdeserters
who were punishedfor joining Mexico's San Patriciobattalion. His main
focus, however, is upon attitudesof U. S. soldiers toward the Mexican
people themselves. It comes as little surprise to learn that views of
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American political, cultural,and racial superiorityenjoyed wide support
among the troops. Such views go far to explaining the widespread
indignitiesheapedupon civilians in the occupiedregions.
Winders relies extensively upon published sources, paying less
attentionto manuscriptletters and diaries. At times the result is more a
pictureof what officers thoughtaboutthe men's behaviorthanit is of what
the men thought of themselves. Given the tendency of many officers,
especially regulars,to differentiatethemselvesfrom the soldiersthey lead,
this can resultin a more traditionaloverview thanWindersintended.
Windersalso might have been more convincingin his treatmentof the
commonsoldierif he had moreclearlydistinguishedbetweenthe two main
armiesof the war.By comparingthe one raisedin 1846, which servedunder
Taylor in northernMexico, with the other raised in considerablepart in
1847, which served with Scott in central Mexico, Winders might have
highlightedconsiderabledifferences. He would certainlyhave had a better
chance to evaluate the performancesof the two very individual Whig
generals, Zachary "Rough and Ready" Taylor and Winfield "Fuss and
Feathers"Scott. Fromthis, Windersmight have built a strongeranswerto
the question of how any Whig general could derive a strong military
performancefroman armythathe picturesin politicaldissonancewith their
commanders. The differencesmight also lead to a review of the fighting
styles of the two armies. Windersdoes not treatoperationsand combatin
detail, and thus avoids the "face of battle"approachin his study. But it
would be interestingto ask if Taylor's improvisationalvictories, such as
Buena Vista, reflect the qualitiesof a body of troops differentfrom those
that Scott led on the roadto Mexico City.
Certainly two types of democracy-political and social-sit
uncomfortablyin separate chapters of the book, and probably sat as
uncomfortablywith many of the men. It's hardto find the same kind of
rough affection for many of Polk's appointedofficers as the men clearly
had for the Whig generals,Winfield Scott and ZacharyTaylor,who were
so often the target of Polk's suspicion and concern. It's also hard to
understandfrom Winders's analysis why FranklinPierce, alone among
Polk's appointees, was able to transferhis wartime performanceinto a
successful presidential bid. Much of the problem probably lies in
Winders's sources,which stressthe accountsof officers and the diariesof
literatevolunteers. It's hardto hearthe inarticulate,but this book certainly
shows us that such questionsare rewardingto ask.
George W. Geib is Distinguished Professor of Liberal Arts at Butler
University. His researchinterestsinclude the frontiermilitias of the early
republic.
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